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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
   
No. 16-1851 
   
TERRY ALLEN HEVNER, 
          Appellant 
 
v. 
 
COMMISSIONER SOCIAL SECURITY 
      
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
 (District Case No. 2-15-cv-00545) 
District Judge:  Honorable Donetta W. Ambrose 
      
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
on November 9, 2016 
 
Before:  JORDAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and RENDELL, Circuit Judges 
 
 
(Opinion filed:  January 13, 2017) 
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O P I N I O N* 
   
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge:  
Terry A. Hevner appeals his denial of disability insurance benefits and 
supplemental security income. He claims that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) 
failed to give appropriate weight to the opinions of one of his treating physicians, Dr. 
Lewis, and one of his consultative examiners, Dr. Hahn, thus leaving the Residual 
Functional Capacity and Step 5 determinations without substantial evidence. We will 
affirm the District Court’s order affirming the ALJ. 
I. Background 
Hevner suffers from chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (“COPD”), 
depression, and anxiety.  He filed an application for disability benefits and supplemental 
security income on July 6, 2011, and was denied benefits on May 17, 2012. Hevner then 
requested a hearing before an ALJ.1  
At the hearing, the ALJ heard Hevner’s testimony. The ALJ also reviewed the 
medical records detailing Hevner’s physical and mental impairments. These included 
treatment notes from Physician Assistant Tardivo, who treated Hevner on multiple 
occasions for his COPD, high blood pressure, and depression and from Drs. Simardeep 
                                              
 * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
1 At the hearing, Hevner amended the alleged onset of his disability from January 1, 2011 
to September 1, 2012. A.243. The record contains medical evidence from before and after 
the amended onset date. 
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Mann, Stephen Neal, and Lisa Lewis, who focused on treating Hevner’s depression and 
anxiety. Dr. Lewis assessed Hevner’s depression to be more severe than did Drs. Mann 
and Neal. The ALJ also considered reports from three consultative examiners: Drs. 
Russell Biundo, Thomas Andrews, and Richard Hahn. In addition to these written 
reports, Drs. Biundo and Hahn filled out forms (titled “Medical Source Statement of 
Claimant’s Ability to Perform Work-Related Physical Activities”), although these forms 
provided conflicting conclusions as to the severity of Hevner’s physical limitations due to 
his COPD. See A.366-67; 482-83.2  
Based on this evidence, the ALJ discounted Dr. Lewis and Dr. Hahn’s opinions 
and concluded that Hevner had the residual functional capacity to perform light 
exertional work subject to some limitations. The ALJ also heard evidence from a 
vocational expert and concluded that, given Hevner’s credited limitations, he was 
“capable of making a successful adjustment to other work that exists in significant 
numbers in the national economy.” A.77. Accordingly, the ALJ denied his application for 
benefits.  
After the Appeals Council denied Hevner’s request for review, Hevner brought 
suit in the District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. The District Court 
affirmed the decision of the ALJ. Hevner then timely appealed. 
 
 
                                              
2 Citations to the record refer to the “Appellant’s Appendix,” filed on July 7, 2016. 
4 
 
II. Analysis3 
An ALJ in a disability benefits case has an “obligation to weigh the medical 
evidence and make choices between conflicting medical evidence.” Williams v. Sullivan, 
970 F.2d 1178, 1187 (3d Cir. 1992). ALJs should “accord treating physicians’ reports 
great weight, especially ‘when their opinions reflect expert judgment based on a 
continuing observation of the patient’s condition over a prolonged period of time.’” 
Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 317 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 
422, 429 (3d Cir. 1999)). But, while the ALJ may not reject a treating physician’s opinion 
outright absent contradictory medical evidence in the record, “such an opinion may be 
afforded ‘more or less weight depending upon the extent to which supporting 
explanations are provided.’” Brownawell v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 554 F.3d 352, 355 (3d 
Cir. 2008) (quoting Plummer, 186 F.3d at 429).  
We review the ALJ’s determination for substantial evidence, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), 
which requires that there be “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to 
support a conclusion.” Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 359 (3d Cir. 
2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). In reviewing for substantial evidence, however, 
we may not reweigh the evidence or substitute our own conclusions for those of the ALJ. 
Id. 
 
 
                                              
3 The District Court had jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and we have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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A. Dr. Lewis 
Hevner first argues that the ALJ erred because he failed to give appropriate weight 
to the findings of Dr. Lewis, one of Hevner’s treating physicians. We disagree. Dr. Lewis 
indicated that Hevner had “marked” or “extreme” functional limitations by checking 
boxes on a form titled “Mental Capacity Assessment.” A.626-27. She did not provide a 
narrative supporting her conclusions nor do any of her treatment notes appear in the 
record. The ALJ nevertheless considered this opinion but accorded it “little weight” 
because “the severity of the limitations provided by Dr. Lewis [were] very inconsistent 
with the mild to moderate findings in the treatment notes” of Drs. Neal and Mann, both of 
whom treated Hevner at the same facility as Dr. Lewis. A.73. Specifically, on December 
5, 2012, Dr. Neal opined that Hevner’s major depressive disorder was “mild,” and that 
Hevner was “benefiting from the medication(s) without side effects.” A.557-58. On 
February 26, 2013, Hevner reported to Dr. Neal that he was “much less depressed and 
anxious, but [was] irritable.” A.553-54. On July 16, 2013, just over a month after Dr. 
Lewis’s assessment, Dr. Neal again concluded that the overall “severity of the problem is 
moderate,” the major depressive disorder remained “mild,” and that the “symptoms are 
relieved by counseling and medication.” A.633, 637.4  
                                              
4 The ALJ noted that this conclusion was also consistent with consultative examiner 
Andrews’ opinion, to which the ALJ also gave “significant weight.” A.73. Hevner argues 
that the ALJ impermissibly considered this report because it was rendered approximately 
a year before Hevner’s amended onset date. We note, however, that “the ALJ is entitled 
to weigh all evidence in making its finding.” Brown v. Astrue, 649 F.3d 193, 196 (3d Cir. 
2011). And here, the ALJ considered not only Dr. Andrews’ opinion but also that of Dr. 
Neal, who treated Hevner well after even his amended onset date. See, e.g., A.633-40 
(documenting Hevner’s visit on July 16, 2013). 
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Moreover, as we have said before, “check box” forms that require little or no 
explanation, such as the mental capacity assessment filled out by Dr. Lewis, are “weak 
evidence at best” in the disability context, and they are particularly so here when 
compared to the more detailed accounts given by Dr. Neal. Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 
1058, 1065 (3d Cir. 1993). Accordingly, the ALJ was entitled to discount Dr. Lewis’s 
opinion. 
B. Dr. Hahn 
 Hevner next argues that the ALJ erred by relying on the opinions of Dr. Biundo 
and P.A. Tardivo over the findings of Dr. Hahn, a consultative examiner who opined that 
Hevner should be limited to activities that require him to stand no more than one hour per 
day. See A.482. The ALJ gave “little weight” to Dr. Hahn’s opinion because it was 
“based on [Hevner’s] subjective complaints alone.” A.72. The ALJ instead accorded 
“significant weight” to Dr. Biundo, also a consultative examiner, who found “no 
evidence of bronchitic symptoms” and whose opinion, in the ALJ’s assessment, was 
“consistent with the objective medical evidence of record, specifically the pulmonary 
function testing.” A.72. The ALJ also gave “significant weight” to P.A. Tardivo’s 
assessments. A.72. 
We see no reason to disturb the ALJ’s weighing of these opinions. The ALJ “may 
choose whom to credit” when considering conflicting evidence so long as he does not 
“reject evidence for no reason or for the wrong reason.” Plummer, 186 F.3d at 429 
(quoting Mason, 994 F.2d at 1066). Here, the ALJ appropriately relied on Dr. Biundo. 
See 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(e). The ALJ also identified why Dr. Hahn’s testimony should be 
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discounted. As the ALJ recognized, Dr. Hahn’s assessment of Hevner’s limitations 
appeared to be largely based on Hevner’s self-reported medical history. Dr. Hahn’s 
conclusions were also questionable in light of his own clinical findings, wherein, for 
example, he found that Hevner had clear lungs, full muscle strength, normal gait and 
station, and intact fine and dexterous movements. A.480. The ALJ also cited to 
pulmonary function tests, objective medical evidence which revealed moderate 
restriction, A.521-22, and “[did] not indicate [that Hevner] had a disabling breathing 
impairment,” A.71. And finally, the ALJ relied on P.A. Tardivo’s treatment notes and 
assessments—which document at least eleven visits to Clay – Battelle Community Health 
Center. Tardivo noted, for example, that Hevner’s COPD symptoms were “mild” and 
“improving” on medication, A.506, and that he had “quiet, even and easy respiratory 
effort,” A.504, 519.5 For these reasons, we find that the ALJ appropriately discounted Dr. 
Hahn’s opinion. 
We note also that, even though Dr. Hahn was not given controlling weight, the 
ALJ did not reject Hevner’s complaints about how COPD affected his ability to work. In 
fact, the ALJ “considered [Hevner’s] subjective complaints . . . and accommodated for 
                                              
5 We reject Hevner’s argument that P.A. Tardivo is not an acceptable medical source 
under the guidelines. Although Tardivo is a physician’s assistant and not a medical 
doctor, her opinion and treatment notes may “provide insight into the severity of the 
impairment[] and how it affects the individual’s ability to function,” and thus are still 
entitled to some weight as an “other source” under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(d)(1). SSR 06–
03p, 2006 WL 2329939, at *2 (Aug. 9, 2006). Here, the ALJ relied on appropriate criteria 
in crediting her opinion. Although Tardivo herself admitted in a 2011 medical source 
statement that she lacked an adequate basis to opine on Hevner’s physical limitations, the 
ALJ also relied on “Ms. Tardivo’s treatment history” with Hevner, which was 
documented by extensive treatment notes, including notes from assessments after the 
amended onset date. A.72. 
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them in the above [RFC].” A.72. Because the ALJ incorporated these limitations into the 
RFC analysis, we see no error in the hypothetical question posed to the vocational expert. 
See Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 554 (3d Cir. 2005) (upholding hypothetical 
question to vocational expert where question adequately reflected the “credibly 
established limitations” in the record). Accordingly, because we find that substantial 
evidence supported the ALJ’s denial of benefits, we will affirm the District Court’s order. 
